题目：Borrower Correlated Liquidity Demands and the Use of Minimum Liquidity Covenants in Loan Contracts
时间：2023年5月29日（周一）10:00-12:00
地点： 浙江大学紫金港校区管理学院A423
主讲人：倪骁然副教授，厦门大学
主讲人简介：
姜舒舒，新加坡国立大学会计学系助理教授。她先后从浙江大学获得管理学学士和多伦多大学获得会计学博士学位。研究领域是会计的契约作用，集中在如何设计和执行契约合同来解决委托代理问题以及环境、社会和公司治理问题。目前已在Journal of International Business Studies等期刊发表学术成果。同时担任会计顶级期刊 Contemporary Accounting Research匿名审稿人。
摘要：
Banks serve as important liquidity providers to the corporate sector. However, a bank’s ability to provide liquidity is limited if many of its borrowers demand liquidity at the same time (i.e., correlated liquidity demands). We predict and find that a bank is more likely to include covenants that require a borrower to hold minimum liquidity (minimum liquidity covenants) in loan contracts when the borrower has higher correlated liquidity demands with the bank’s loan portfolio. We further find that the effect of borrower-lender portfolio liquidity demand correlation on the use of minimum liquidity covenants is stronger when banks are more affected by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio regulations, when borrowers experience negative liquidity shocks, and when borrowers face greater financial constraints. Lastly, we find that borrowers have lower liquidity risks after obtaining loans with minimum liquidity covenants. Overall, our findings suggest that banks actively monitor their borrowers’ liquidity to ensure their role as liquidity providers.